Theories and opinions on this topic are as abundant as are the theories and opinions on Iraq or, for that matter, any war.
The Background
First and foremost, we were attacked by people that were trained and funded by groups inside Afghanistan that were allowed to be there by the Taliban, the ruling power from September 1996 until November 2001. They officially sanctioned Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaida in their preparation for operations against western targets. Everyone in the world but the majority of Afghans knew that al-Qaida were responsible for the various attacks around the world. The Taliban kept the population in the dark about what was happening, opting instead to enforce their brand of Islamic law against any member of the population that displayed western traits or were violating the Taliban interpretation of the Quran.
Even Pakistan, who initially introduced the Taliban as a security force for convoys from Pakistan into Afghanistan, recognized the need to attempt to control the Taliban after September 11, 2001. As a result of Pakistan's original agreement with the group and access to better weapons, the Taliban surfaced as the strongest faction of all of those that scrambled for power after the Russians left and the communist Afghan government folded. The entire world knew something had to be done to avoid further attacks from this well equipped and mysteriously funded group of "Muslim" radicals. To the rest of the world Afghanistan, the Taliban and al-Qaeda (and even Osama bin Laden) were all the same.
Somehow we had conveniently forgotton that we assisted the Afghan Freedom Fighters (as we called them) in increasing their capabilities to oust the Soviets. The United States, through a convoluted local network, provided them with Stinger missiles that had done two things: First it proved to us that our anti-aircraft missiles would work in austere, mountainous environments, and second, it reduced the air threat by the communists against the Mujahadeen fighters. They could finally shoot down HIP and HIND helicopters that were decimating the Afghans without any defense against them. Eventually this effort by us, coupled with the dogged determination of the Afghan fighters, led to acquiescence on the part of the Soviet Army. As the communists pulled out and the Soviet vehicles rolled across the Freedom Bridge back into Uzbekistan in 1989 we felt our work here was done and our funding to support the Mujahadeen dried up. Without some leverage the people we had supported now had no ability to continue to gain power and they lost their fight to the Taliban after a few years. Incredibly U.S. Special Forces troops were able to regain some valuable assistance from the Northern Alliance when it came time to pust the Taliban out of power. How we ever pulled that off will probably remain classified for years to come. Suffice it to say that we still had a few connections that paid off.
So, since early 2002 we have begun assisting in the rebuilding of Afghanistan. We are not alone in this effort with about 40 countries hovering around the country "providing assistance" under a U.N. flag. We seem to be one of a few that are willing to provide armed support to our new Afghan allies. Save for the British, Canadians, Dutch, and the French the rest of the countries, however well-meaning, only want to provide mentors to all of the government branches that need assistance. Unfortunately that adds to the amount of western targets that someone has to protect. Only a few countries that cannot "fight" the Taliban even allow their countryment to defend themselves. So that leaves the countries that are willing to fight a much bigger mission when these mentors are out doing their good deeds amongst the Afghan population. Not that I am critical of the mentors, I would just like to see them come with their own protection like we and a few others are doing.
Where We Stand Today
Today Afghanistan sits in the political and public affairs shadow of Iraq, rolled up into one war that is hard to explain. Had we continued the effort solely in Afghanistan it would have been easier to allow Joe Sixpack to understand but we would have been much further into our commitment than we are today. Casualties would be higher because the non-Iraqi fighters that were drawn to the conflict in Iraq would have declared their jihad anyway and traveled to Afghanistan to kill Infidels. All the while the funding from countries sympathetic to the terrorists would be flowing east of Iran instead of west into Iraq. Our citizens would be saying much the same thing about supporting the troops but that the war had gone off in a direction that needed to be reevaluated. Questions like "Why can't you find bin Laden?" and "How can a bunch of untrained and ill-equipped terrorists be keeping us from winning?" would replace the outcry over no WMD found in Iraq. Americans, better yet all westerners, are tired of being held hostage at airports and train stations by mere threats. They don't seem to understand that there will never be a time like the past. Even if or when we find bin Laden the terrorism threat has risen to a new level of international normalcy and will still be a part of our daily lives. What was once known about only through newspaper articles about the mideast is now in our faces forever. That may be sad but unfortunately that is a fact.
We have another 20,000 troops moving into the country in early 2009. That additional security will help us in rebuilding some of the old and destroyed infrastructure and developing new infrastructure where none existed before. Building is the hard part because it's not just that building things is an issue; building trust among the population is nearly impossible. The two have to be accomplished in a timed and deliberate manner. Something that is hard to do when the longest any one unit stays on the ground is now less than one year. In my experience there never seemed to be anyone directing the central effort. Allied countries, as well-meaning as they are, don't always send worker level people to do the mentoring at ground level. Too many countries are sending people to work with the high-ranking Afghans to direct them. The Kabul Provincial Chief of Police had no less than three mentors when I left the country in June 2007. None of them went outside a few downtown districts to see what was needed in the outlying districts where the Police had the best ability to intercept Anti-coalition militia (ACM) before they got to the capital city. So no proactive effort was made to correct issues that were identified early on in the police mentoring mission. One team of three American Soldiers and two DynCorp contractors were responsible for working with 34 police officials in as many districts in the Kabul Province.
Also, in building trust, its important to realize that we are actively supporting government agencies that don't trust us while they, themselves, are not trusted by the population. So we have to get down to village level with our Afghan counterparts and engender a mutual trust between the population and the government while we, ourselves, develop trust between the coalition and the Afghan government. That means we have to follow through on promises to complete projects that are important to them and help build their economy. According to Michael Yon, a free-lance reporter who spends a lot of time on the ground outside coalition circles, the cost of wheat is now more profitable than the poppy to Afghan farmers. That is extremely inportant if we are going to attempt to reduce opium production in that country. If other crops can equal or exceed the farmer's profit from the poppy crop then farmers have an alternative that makes sense to pursue.
These people are talented and know how to make things work. In mountains that you and I would have abandoned long ago they have built irrigation systems that are not unlike those in other, less arid countries in Asia. Rice paddys are as prevalent as corn and wheat fields in the lower areas of the mountains along the Pakistan border. With the right education these people could easily have an agricultural industry that would provide honest wages to currently unemployed young men that are perfect targets for recruitment into fanatical religious groups. If you talk to police and village elders they will tell you just that.
Where Do We Go From Here?
Get the United Nations off their posterior padding and get them to take ownership of the problem. Develop a list of priorities and a sequence in which the projects will be initiated. Match interested countries with projects that they can achieve. If a small country wants to pitch in with a larger one as a "sub-contractor" then allow it. Require periodic reviews of all projects so that all parties stay on track and don't let "mission creep" move them off of their primary objective. All the while this is occuring make sure that the countries that can maintain security for the projects are allowed to do so. Also keep the pressure on the existing threat from the Taliban and other ACM. Put troops in areas where the bad guys are active and provide security to villages that volunteer to help push them away.
As far as Osama bin Laden is concerned, forget about him. Cut his legs out from under him and he's doomed anyway. His entire existance is based on fear that can be removed completely if we start attacking the problem seriously and with a bit of imagination. But follow-up is absolutely necessary. Never promise an Afghan anything that you don't intend to give him unless you want an enemy for life.
Sarmajor
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